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Recent Developments

Rice v. Paladin Enters. Inc.:

I

na case of first impression,
the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128
F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), held that
the First Amendment does not
pose a bar to a finding of civil
liability against a publisher in a
state wrongful death action.
While acknowledging that the
U.S. Constitution does offer
protection for speech representing
the
abstract
advocacy
of
lawlessness, the court found that
this shelter is not absolute and the
speech engaged in by Paladin
Press
does
not
warrant
protection.
On March 3, 1993, James
Perry ("Perry") murdered Mildred
Hom, her eight year old
quadriplegic son Trevor, and
Trevor's nurse. Perry was hired to
commit these murders by Mildred
Hom's ex-husband, Lawrence
Hom, who hoped to receive the
two million dollars that his son
received as settlement for the
injuries which had left him
paralyzed. In preparation for
these murders, Perry closely
followed the directions contained
in Hit Man: A Technical Manual
for Independent Contractors ("Hit
Man") and How to Make a
Disposable Silencer, Vol II, both
of which are published by Paladin
Enterprises, Inc. ("Paladin").
Upon discovering the pivotal
role that Hit Man played in the
execution of this crime, the
relatives and representatives of
the murder victims brought a
wrongful death action against
Paladin. The complaint alleged
that Paladin aided and abetted
Perry in the commission of these
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murders through the publication of
Hit
Man with
its explicit
instructions on how to commit and
cover-up a contract murder. The
United States District Court for the
District of Maryland granted
Paladin's motion for summary
judgment and held that the
plaintiffs' claims were barred by
the First Amendment as a matter
of law. The plaintiffs appealed,
and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
granted certiorari.
The court of appeals opened
its opinion by quoting various
passages of Hit Man that are
representative of the instructions
within its pages. Rice, 128 F.3d
at
235-39. The court then
specifically outlined how Perry,
relying on these instructions,
committed the murders and then
attempted to cover them up. Id.
at 239-241.
Beginning its analysis, the
court examined the distinction
between protected speech and
that which is afforded no
constitutional protection. Id. at
243-44. The court first referred to
Brandenburg v. Ohio as the
leading case recognizing that
"abstract advocacy of lawlessness

is protected speech under the
First Amendment." Id. at 243
(citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969». The court of
appeals determined that this right,
however, is not absolute. Id. at
243. The court recognized that
speech which "is tantamount to
legitimately
proscribable
nonexpressive conduct may itself
be
legitimately
proscribed,
punished, or regulated ...." Id.
In support of this, the court looked
to two Supreme Court decisions.
Id. In Giboney v. Empire Storage
& Ice Co., the Supreme Court
rejected "a First Amendment
challenge to an injunction
forbidding unionized distributors
from picketing to force an illegal
business arrangement." Id. (citing
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949». The
court next cited Brown v. Hartlage
as a recent example of the
Supreme Court's decision not to
allow a First Amendment defense
when the activity sought to be
protected involved illegal activity.
Id. at 243, 244 (citing Brown v.
Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982».
The court of appeals next
analyzed whether the First
Amendment posed a bar to
liability for aiding and abetting a
criminal offense. Id. at 244. In a
case the court of appeals called
"indistinguishable in principle"
from the instant case, the Ninth
Circuit held that the First
Amendment "does not provide
publishers a defense as a matter
of law to charges of aiding and
abetting a crime .... " Id. at 244
(citing United States v. Bamett,
667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982».
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Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit
previously held that the First
Amendment offered no protection
to speech which was not abstract
in its criticism of tax law, but
instead urged people to file false
tax returns, with the expectation
that this advice would be heeded.
Id. at 245, 246 (citing United
States v. Kelly, 769 F.2d 215,217
(4th Cir. 1985». The court of
appeals, through Barnett and
Kelly, justified its analysis that
speech which is found criminally
liable may likewise be subjected
to civil liability. Id. at 247.
The court then identified two
possible qualifications to this
conclusion. Id. at 247. The first
involved
a
"heightened
intentrequirement" to prevent the
punishment or abolishment of
innocent and lawfully useful
speech. Id. The court stated that
in some contexts, foreseeability or
knowledge that the offered
information may be used for an
improper purpose was not enough
to impose liability. Id. The court
then distinguished the case at bar
from this exception by implying
that liability is not absolved when
"those who would, for profit or
other motive, intentionally assist
and encourage crime and then
shamelessly seek refuge in the
sanctuary
of
the
First
Amendment." Id. at 248.
The second qualification
identified by the court was that
the First Amendment imposed
similar
limitations
on
the
imposition of civil liability for
abstract advocacy as it would for
of criminal
the
imposition
punishment for the same type of
speech. Id. at 248-49. Because
the court firmly believed that
Paladin's speech was "so
comprehensive and detailed" in its
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narration and instruction on
murder, the speech, under no
be
circumstances
could
considered abstract advocacy,
and therefore this qualification
was inapplicable. Id. at 249. After
determining that the Supreme
Court has left unprotected the
type of speech Hit Man delivered,
the court held "that the First
Amendment [did] not pose a bar
to the plaintiffs' civil aiding and
abetting cause of action against
Paladin Press." Id. at 250.
Turning its focus to the
analysis of Maryland law, the
court of appeals next identified
two errors committed by the
district court when it ruled in favor
of Paladin. Id. The first error was
the district court's failure "to
realize that Maryland does
recognize a civil cause of action
for aiding and abetting" at the
time of its initial ruling. Id. at 25051. The court, after discussing
the intent standard implicit in
Maryland's aiding and abetting
civil tort law, determined that
Maryland would allow a cause of
action in the instant case. Id. at
251-52.
Additionally, Paladin stipulated
that it intended and had
knowledge that Hit Man would be
used by criminals to commit
murder. Id. at 252-53. Moreover,
Paladinconceded that it engaged
in a marketing strategy to attract
and assist these individuals in the
pursuit of this information. Id. at
253-54. Therefore, the court held
that a reasonable jury could find
that Paladin possessed the
requisite intent under Maryland
law as well as the heightened
First Amendment standard. Id. at
255.
The second error identified by
the court was the district court's

misunderstanding of the Supreme
Court's holding in Brandenburg.
Id at 264. The court of appeals
emphasized
that
Paladin's
speech, because it was so
detailed and methodical in its
explanations and instructions on
how to plan, commit, and coverup the crime of murder, was not
abstract speech and therefore
could be afforded no protection by
the First Amendment. Id. at 256.
In
explanation,
the
court
examined Hit Man chapter by
chapter, and concluded that the
book published by Paladin did not
contain the character of speech
that Brandenburg sought to
protect. Id. at 262.
By holding that the First
Amendment would not shield
Paladin from civil liability, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit clarified the distinction
between speech that is afforded
constitutional protection and that
In stark and
which is not.
compelling language, the court
found that Hit Man served no
legitimate purpose but instead
gave specific instructions on
reprehensible criminal conduct.
While the ramifications from this
holding have yet to be seen, the
court should be mindful of the
slippery slope which it is
approaching.
The
First
Amendment is a fundamental
principle of our constitutional
system, and it allows for the free
flow of ideas and discussion. In
most circumstances, this privilege
to speak ones mind occurs
without the threat of legal
repercussions. It is for these core
constitutional values that, if not
rigidly construed, this landmark
decision will open avenues of tort
liability many thought closed.

